Appeal No. 121,204: State of Kansas v. Michael Steven Martinez
Summary calendar; no oral argument
In a decision written by Justice K.J. Wall, a majority of the Supreme Court affirmed Martinez's Finney County conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. On appeal, Martinez alleged several trial errors and challenged the constitutionality of K.S.A 21-5705(e)(2), which creates a mandatory (albeit rebuttable) presumption of a defendant's intent to distribute a controlled substance if the defendant possessed at least 3.5 grams of methamphetamine. The majority held Martinez lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute's mandatory presumption because that presumption was not applied to him at trial. The majority also found jury instruction errors occurred, but held the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial testimony establishing Martinez's intent to distribute methamphetamine was compelling and undisputed. In a concurring decision, Justice Caleb Stegall agreed with the result but would have found that one of the jury instructions was legally appropriate. Chief Justice Marla Luckert joined the concurrence.
Appeal No. 121,460: State of Kansas v. Matthew Paul Slusser
Appeal No. 121,460 archived oral argument
I n a decision written by Justice K.J. Wall, a majority of the Supreme Court affirmed Slusser's Shawnee County conviction for driving with a suspended license but reversed his convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and aggravated child endangerment.Slusser's convictions arose from an incident in which he was found to be in possession of 11.2 grams of methamphetamine while driving a car with two minor children inside.
On review, the majority declined to reach the merits of Slusser's constitutional challenge to K.S.A 21-5705(e)(2), which creates a mandatory (albeit rebuttable) presumption of a defendant's intent to distribute a controlled substance if the defendant possessed at least 3.5 grams of methamphetamine. The majority held Slusser lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute because it was not applied to him at trial. The majority also declined to reach the merits of Slusser's challenge to a jury instruction, which permitted jurors to infer an intent to distribute based on the quantity of methamphetamine Slusser possessed, because the defendant asked the district court judge to give that instruction to the jury. But the majority held the prosecutor committed reversible error by mischaracterizing the inference of intent instruction and describing it in a way that shifted the burden of proof on the element of intent to Slusser. The majority thus reversed Slusser's conviction for those offenses that required the State to prove Slusser's intent to distribute methamphetamine and remanded for a new trial.
In a concurring decision, Justice Caleb Stegall agreed with the result but would have found the challenged jury instruction was legally appropriate. Chief Justice Marla Luckert joined the concurrence.
Appeal No. 121,865: State of Kansas v. Shameke Caesar Strong
Appeal No. 121,865 archived oral argument
In a decision written by Justice K.J. Wall, a majority of the Supreme Court affirmed Strong's Riley County convictions for possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, Strong alleged error regarding a jury instruction on the element of intent to distribute and challenged the constitutionality of K.S.A 21-5705(e)(2), which creates a mandatory (albeit rebuttable) presumption of a defendant's intent to distribute a controlled substance if the defendant possessed at least 3.5 grams of methamphetamine. The majority found the challenged jury instruction was erroneous, but held the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence establishing Strong's intent to distribute methamphetamine was compelling and uncontroverted. The majority also held Strong lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute's mandatory presumption because the presumption was not applied to him at trial. Finally, the majority rejected two challenges to the constitutionality of Strong's sentence based on controlling precedent.
In a concurring decision, Justice Caleb Stegall agreed with the result but would have found the challenged jury instruction was legally appropriate. Chief Justice Marla Luckert joined the concurrence.
Appeal No. 123,185: State of Kansas v. Cory Wayne Bentley
Appeal No. 123,185 archived oral argument
In 2018 in Sedgwick County, law enforcement officers stopped Bentley in his vehicle after witnessing him commit traffic infractions. Upon discovering Bentley's license was suspended, officers placed Bentley under arrest and searched the vehicle. They located approximately 27 grams of methamphetamine, two firearms, and empty plastic baggies. A jury convicted Bentley of two counts of possessing firearms by a felon, one count of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute between 3.5 and 100 grams, one count of driving with a suspended license, and a traffic infraction. Bentley appealed all his convictions but the traffic infraction.
In a decision written by Justice Eric Rosen, the Supreme Court affirmed all convictions except for the suspended license conviction. It rejected Bentley's claims that some of his statements had been involuntary and that his counsel had been ineffective in pursuing a guilt-based defense without Bentley's explicit consent. It further ruled the Sedgwick County District Court made three harmless errors. It erred when it did not obtain a knowing waiver of Bentley's right to jury trial before accepting his stipulation to one element of the firearms charges. It also erred when it did not instruct the jury on possession with intent to distribute less than a gram and intent to distribute between 1 and 3.5 grams as lesser included offenses of the distribution charge. And it erred when it permitted the jury to presume Bentley intended to distribute methamphetamine if it found he possessed 3.5 grams or more because the applicable law required—rather than permitted—the jury to apply this presumption. All three errors were harmless because they had not affected the results of the trial. Finally, the Court held the evidence was insufficient to support the suspended license charge because it did not show Bentley had actual knowledge his license was suspended.
Justice Stegall concurred in the result. Chief Justice Marla Luckert joined the concurrence.